This paper examines the implications of "keeping up with the Joneses" preferences (jealousy) for the welfare effects of monetary policy. I develop a New Keynesian model, where households are jealous and the central bank follows the Taylor rule. I show that the welfare effects of monetary policy over time depend significantly on the relative strength of the consumption externality caused by jealousy and the monopolistic distortion. If jealousy (the monopolistic distortion) dominates, then a decrease in the interest rate reduces (increases) welfare in the short run, but increases (reduces) welfare in the medium run.
Introduction
There is substantial evidence that individuals derive utility not only from the level of their own consumption, but also from the consumption of the people around them, as emphasised by Ravina (2007) . Using micro level data, Ravina …nds that relative consumption or the so-called "keeping up with the Joneses" is an important determinant of household decision making. In addition, her …ndings support the theories that explain macroeconomic phenomena by introducing habit formation in the utility function.
The implications of habit formation for monetary policy have been analysed e.g. by Fuhrer (2000) and Amato and Laubach (2004) . Fuhrer (2000) shows that habit formation, where utility depends on the consumer's own past consumption, can enhance the ability of monetary policy models to account for the hump-shaped response of consumption to monetary shocks. Amato and Laubach (2004) study the implications of habit formation for optimal monetary policy.
Although the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect might be an important factor to explain macroeconomic phenomena, Ry¤ (2010) points out that in the …eld of monetary economics, its impact has not been studied widely. 1 Pierdzioch (2003), Pierdzioch and Yener (2004) and Tervala (2007) have analysed the implications of keeping up with the Joneses preferences for the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. These studies, however, have abstracted from much that the …eld of monetary economics has learned about monetary policy modeling by analysing the e¤ects of a simple shock to the money supply. In more sophisticated analyses of monetary policy, policy is described in terms of rules setting the nominal interest rate.
One purpose of this study is to examine whether the welfare results of Pierdzioch (2003) , Pierdzioch and Yener (2004) and Tervala (2007) are valid in a more sophisticated framework, where monetary policy is described in terms of a rule setting the nominal interest rate. In addition, the previous studies have been missing a thorough analysis of the evolution of welfare over time. The main contribution of this paper is to go beyond the previous studies, which employ simultaneous one-step-ahead pricing, and to analyse the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy over time. To do this, I use a New Keynesian model with the Calvo-pricing mechanism.
The above-mentioned studies have shown the dependence of the overall welfare e¤ect of monetary policy on the interplay between the consumption 1 externality caused by keeping up with the Joneses preferences and the monopolistic distortion. In these papers, expansionary monetary policy can be welfare-reducing, if households are su¢ ciently jealous and the economy suffers from overemployment. The reason is that in such a case, expansionary monetary policy increases employment that is already higher than the social optimum.
The …ndings of this paper generalise the results of the earlier studies: If the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, then expansionary monetary policy can reduce overall welfare (the discounted present value of welfare) also in the framework where monetary policy is modelled in terms of an interest rate rule (the Taylor rule). More importantly, this present paper shows that keeping up with the Joneses preferences can reverse the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy both in the short and medium run. If the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong (weak), then expansionary monetary policy decreases (increases) welfare in the short run. On the other hand, if the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong (weak), then policy increases (decreases) welfare in the medium run. Thus, keeping up with the Joneses preferences have important implications for the evolution of welfare over time.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In Section 2, I lay out the model. In Section 3, I study the implications of keeping up with the Joneses preferences for the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. Section 4 concludes the paper. The utility function of the representative household is given by
where E t is the expectation operator; (0 < < 1) is the discount factor, C is a CES basket of all varieties consumed by the household (de…ned below), C A is average consumption goods across all households, the parameter captures the desire to keep up with the Joneses (as explained below), (> 0) is a parameter and`stands for labour supply. The overall consumption index is
where c (z) is consumption of commodity z by the household and (> 1) is the elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods. The consumptionbased price index is
where the price of commodity z is denoted by p (z).
To capture the idea of jealousy, parameter is restricted to 0 < < 1. The utility function implies that
The above equation shows that an increase in average consumption lowers the representative household's utility. In the terminology of Gali (1994) and Dupor and Liu (2003) , this property is referred as to "jealousy."
The marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption can be de…ned as
In this model,
This is a property that I dub "keeping up with the Joneses," following the terminology followed by Gali (1994) and Dupor and Liu (2003) . It implies that the marginal utility of the representative household's consumption relative to leisure increases in the case where average consumption increases. As further emphasised by Dupor and Liu (2003) , if preferences re ‡ect a desire to keep up with the Joneses, the representative household derives greater utility from extra consumption relative to leisure in the case where other households increase their consumption. Therefore, the household who does not take into account the e¤ect of its behaviour on others induces an externality.
Budget Constraints and Optimal Behaviour
In every period, the representative household is subject to the budget constraint
Here, D t denotes one-period bonds (that pay one unit of currency in period t + 1) held at the beginning of period t, i t is the nominal interest rate on bonds between t 1 and t, w t is the nominal wage paid to the household in a competitive labour market and t denotes the household's share of the nominal pro…ts (dividends) of all …rms. All households own an equal share of all …rms. The representative household maximises the utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) . The optimal consumption/savings and labour supply decisions are governed by the following equations:
Equation (3) is the standard Euler equation: The representative household tends to smooth consumption. Equation (4) shows that the labour supply is a positive function of the real wage, a negative function of the household's own consumption but a positive function of average consumption. In addition, the higher the parameter that captures the disutility of labour ( ), the lower the labour supply.
Monetary Policy
The Taylor rule (Taylor 1993) implies that the central bank raises the nominal interest rate if in ‡ation rises above the in ‡ation target or if the output gap becomes positive. In this paper, the in ‡ation target is zero. As standard in the New Keynesian literature, the output gap is de…ned as the deviation of output from the equilibrium level that would prevail in the absence of nominal rigidities. Therefore, in this model, the central bank responds directly to the deviation of output from the initial steady state level.
Estimates of Taylor-type monetary policy rules typically …nd a high degree of interest rate smoothing. Therefore I assume that the central bank follows the log-linear Taylor rule with interest rate smoothinĝ
In this equation, the coe¢ cients 1 , 2 and 3 are non-negative and chosen by the central banks, denotes the …rst di¤erence operator and i;t is an unpredictable shift in the monetary policy rule. 4 
Supply Side: Firms
Let us assume a continuum of …rms, indexed by z 2 [0; 1]. Each …rm produces a di¤erentiated good with a production technology
where y t (z) is the output of …rm z and`t (z) denotes labour input used by …rm z. Firms maximise pro…ts taking into account the downwards-sloping demand for their products. Pro…ts are given by
The demands for their products is given by
In the absence of nominal rigidities, …rms maximise t (z) with respect to p t (z). This implies that
An isoelastic demand function implies that the price of good z is a constant markup over the marginal cost.
To model price rigidities, I follow the formulation of Calvo (1983). This implies that each …rm may reset its price in any given period with a probability 1 , independently of other …rms and the amount of time since the last adjustment. Therefore, in setting its price, each …rm has to take into account that there is a probability 0 < < 1 in every subsequent period that it will not be able to revise its price setting decision. When setting a new price in period t, each …rm maximises the present value of pro…ts, weighting future pro…ts by the probability that the price will still be e¤ective in that period. Therefore, the representative …rm seeks to maximise
where Q t;s is a stochastic discount factor between period t and period s. The pricing rule can be written as
5
The log-linear version of equation (7) can be written aŝ
where percentage changes from the initial steady state (denoted by the subscript zero) are denoted by hats; therefore, for any variable,x t = dx t =x 0 . Equation (8) shows that the optimal price is the weighted average of the current and future marginal costs.
Symmetric Steady State
The model is log-linearised around the ‡exible price steady state, in which all exogenous variables are constant. The model abstracts from investment and government spending. Therefore, consumption equals output in every period. In addition, for simplicity, consider a symmetric equilibrium in which the representative household consumption is average. Then, in a symmetric equilibrium, (4), (5) and (6) imply that the initial level of employment and output is y 0 (z) =`t(z) = ( 1) (1 )
As each …rm has monopoly power over the commodity it produces, and household preferences feature a keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect, the level of employment (and output) may be suboptimally low or high in the decentralised competitive equilibrium. To see this, assume a social planner (SP) internalises the consumption externality by setting C = C A and maximises the utility of consumption net of the costs of the foregone leisure
The solution is`S
Equations (9) and (10) demonstrate that the employment level in the decentralised equilibrium can di¤er from the social optimum. The comparison between these equations reveals that
On one hand, the term ( 1)= shows a distortion caused by monopolistic competition. On the other hand, the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect increases employment (output), as a household derives greater utility from extra consumption relative to leisure if other households increase their consumotion. The relative strength of these distortions determine the level of employment which may exceed or fall below the social optimum. Therefore, monetary policy that increases employment may bring it closer to the social optimum or move it even farther away from its socially optimal level.
Choice of Parameter Values
Periods are de…ned as quarters. Therefore, the discount factor is set to 0:99, which implies about 4 percent annual real interest rate. The price adjustment parameter ( ) is set to 0.5, implying an average delay between price adjustments of six months. This is in line with the empirical …ndings of Bils and Klenow (2004) . The elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated goods ( ) is set equal to 6, implying a 20 percent mark-up of prices over the marginal cost in the steady state. This value is commonly used in the business cycle literature. The parameter that captures the disutility of labour ( ) is set to 1.
The interest rate smoothing parameter in the Taylor rule ( 1 ) is set to 0.8. This is consistent with the empirical …ndings of Clarida et al. (2000) . In addition, 2 is set to 1:5 and 3 is set to 0:25.
I analyse the dependence of the welfare results on the parameter ( ), which captures the desire to keep up with the Joneses by considering alternative values for it. I consider two basic values in our experiments: = 0:1 and = 0:2. These values are chosen because in the …rst (second) case, the employment level in the decentralised equilibrium is below (exceeds) the social optimum (recall equations (11) and (12)). 2 
Equilibrium Dynamics
In this section, I analyse the e¤ects of an expansionary monetary policy shock, using a log-linear version of the model. It is worth emphasising that the parameter does not a¤ect the log-linear version of the model. Therefore, the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect does not a¤ect the response of the economy to an interest rate shock. Nevertheless, the e¤ect has signi…cant implications for welfare, as discussed below. Figure 1 , on page 13, illustrates the dynamic e¤ects of a 1 percent negative shock to the Taylor rule ( i;1 = 1). In the …gure, the horizontal axes show time and the vertical axes show the variables' percentage deviations from the initial steady state.
Method of Welfare Analysis
In previous studies that have analysed the welfare e¤ects of external habit formation -Pierdzioch (2003), Pierdzioch and Yener (2004) and Tervala (2007) -all prices are …xed for one period and the economy reaches the new steady state after that period. Thus, the welfare e¤ect is the short-run change in utility plus the discounted present value of the change in steadystate utility. Since the present model uses staggered price setting, I use a di¤erent method to analyse welfare changes. First, I study the change in period-by-period utility. Then, I calculate the discounted present value (DPV) of the change in utility, using a large number of periods. 3 The change in utility in period t is given by
The DPV of these changes is
Panel (d) of Figure 1 illustrates the changes in the period's utility, in the cases of = 0:1 and = 0:2. Table 1 shows the sign of the change in the period's utility in the 1st and 5th period and the DPV of the change in utility for the same parameterisation considered in Figure 1 . The DPV of change in utility and the overall welfare e¤ect are used as synonymous in the text below. 
Welfare E¤ects of Monetary Policy
In the short run, the presence of staggered price setting implies that the central bank's decision to lower the nominal interest rate is not matched 3 The same method is used in the open-economy model of Tervala (2010).
8 by a one-for-one change in expected in ‡ation. Therefore, it lowers the real interest rate and consumption increases in the short run. This results in a demand-driven increase in output and employment in the short run. In the medium run, in ‡ation has decreased the real wage below the steady state level and output falls relative to the initial steady state. In the long run, prices adjust and output reverts back to the original level. Panel (d) of Figure 1 shows that a decrease in the interest rate increases welfare in the short run, if = 0:1. In this case, the level of employment is lower than its socially optimal level because < 1= . A monetary shock brings the level of consumption and employment temporarily closer to the social optimum, increasing welfare.
In the case of = 0:1, welfare decreases in the medium run. The reason is that expansionary monetary policy decreases employment and consumption that are already ine¢ ciently low. However, the DPV of change in welfare is positive (0.002). Therefore, the short-run welfare e¤ect of monetary policy dominates the medium-run welfare e¤ect.
Panel (d) illustrates that a high value of reverses the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy. In this case, the consumption externality caused by the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect dominates the monopolistic competition distortion. Therefore, the initial level of employment is higher than its socially optimal level. Monetary policy that causes an increase in employment does not bring employment closer to the social optimum, but moves it farther away from it. Therefore, policy lowers welfare in the short run. In the medium run, a decrease in employment is welfare-improving. The reason is that a fall in employment temporarily mitigates the overemployment problem. However, in the case of = 0:2, the DPV of change in welfare is negative (-0.001).
The …ndings of this paper, regarding the overall welfare e¤ect of monetary policy, are consistent with the earlier literature. Pierdzioch (2003) , Pierdzioch and Yener (2004) and Tervala (2007) have shown the dependence of the overall welfare e¤ect of monetary policy on the interplay between the consumption externality caused by the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect and the monopolistic distortion. In these papers, an exogenous rise in the money supply can be welfare-reducing if the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong. The …ndings of this paper generalise the results of the earlier studies: If the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, then expansionary monetary policy can reduce welfare also in the framework where monetary policy is modelled in terms of an interest rate rule.
Moreover, this paper shows that keeping up with the Joneses preferences have di¤erent e¤ects on welfare in the short run than in the medium run. If the keeping up with the Joneses e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong (weak), then expansionary monetary policy decreases (increases) welfare in the short run. On the other hand, if the e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong (weak), then policy increases (decreases) welfare in the medium run. Therefore keeping up with the Joneses preferences can reverse the welfare e¤ects of monetary policy both in the short and medium run. 
Conclusions

